How the subprime market triggered a global financial crisis

In consumer finance, the term subprime refers to loans made to borrowers who don’t meet conventional credit standards. These borrowers typically have low credit scores (often below 620), limited income documentation, high debt loads, or past defaults. To compensate for this risk, lenders charge higher interest rates.

Subprime loans span multiple categories:

• Mortgages for homebuyers with poor credit
• Auto loans for borrowers with limited collateral
• Personal loans or credit cards with punitive fees or rates

The subprime label doesn’t imply illegality or even irresponsibility. In theory, it allows financially marginalised individuals to access credit. But when overused or mismanaged, subprime lending can create ripple effects far beyond individual borrowers—especially when bundled into securities and resold.

Subprime lending emerged in the United States during the 1980s. A wave of financial deregulation allowed non-bank lenders more leeway to offer credit without adhering to the strict underwriting rules that traditional banks followed. Initially, this was framed as inclusionary finance—helping people with imperfect credit histories purchase homes or consolidate debts. Community reinvestment efforts also pressured banks to lend in historically underserved areas.

By the 1990s, a second layer emerged: securitization. Lenders began packaging loans—including subprime ones—into mortgage-backed securities (MBS). These were sold to investors, removing the loan from the lender’s balance sheet and transferring the repayment risk.

This architecture allowed lenders to keep issuing more loans, with minimal concern about whether the borrower would actually repay. Investors, hungry for yield in a low-interest-rate environment, eagerly bought these MBS products—many rated as safe by credit agencies despite being backed by risky subprime loans.

From 2003 to 2006, subprime mortgage originations exploded. Several factors contributed:

1. Low interest rates following the dot-com bust made borrowing cheaper.
2. Housing prices were rising, creating an illusion of safety—borrowers could refinance or sell if needed.
3. Loose underwriting: Lenders began approving “no doc” (no income documentation) and “interest-only” loans.
4. Investor demand: Wall Street institutions paid handsomely for subprime MBS, incentivising lenders to prioritise volume over quality.

At its peak, subprime loans made up about one in five new mortgages in the US. While some borrowers benefited—especially those who improved their credit and refinanced—many others were exposed to loans they couldn't realistically repay.

In Singapore terms, it would be akin to a flood of HDB owners taking up interest-only private property loans with minimal documentation, hoping prices would continue rising.

When housing prices began to fall in 2007, the subprime machine broke down. Borrowers who had counted on home appreciation found themselves underwater—owing more than their properties were worth. Many couldn’t refinance. Defaults surged. But the real damage wasn’t just at the borrower level. Banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies had stacked subprime-backed securities into portfolios worth hundreds of billions. Once loan defaults increased, the value of these securities collapsed.

A few key failures that cascaded into full crisis:

• Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed in June 2007.
• Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008.
• AIG required a massive bailout due to its exposure to subprime insurance derivatives (credit default swaps).

By late 2008, global credit markets froze. Banks refused to lend—even to each other. The global financial crisis had begun.

Subprime lending alone didn’t cause the crisis. But it revealed deep flaws in how financial systems price and transfer risk. Three structural problems amplified the damage:

1. Originate-to-Distribute Model

Lenders no longer held the loans they originated. Instead, they sold them to investment banks, which bundled them into securities. This removed accountability for long-term loan performance. A subprime borrower could take a mortgage from a broker, but the risk ultimately sat with a pension fund in Europe or a sovereign wealth fund in Asia—often unknowingly.

2. Misaligned Incentives

Every party in the chain profited from loan volume, not loan quality. Brokers earned fees. Banks sold more securities. Ratings agencies, paid by issuers, had little reason to scrutinize. Borrowers, too, were encouraged to take out larger loans, lured by artificially low “teaser” interest rates.

3. Leverage and Complexity

Financial institutions used massive leverage to amplify returns on subprime-linked assets. Derivatives like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDS) added layers of complexity and fragility. When defaults began, no one knew where the losses sat—or how deep the exposure went.

The scale of the crisis forced unprecedented intervention. In the US:

• Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010).
• The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was created to regulate lending.
• Banks faced higher capital requirements.
• Mortgage rules tightened, banning some exotic subprime products and requiring income verification.

Globally, financial regulators introduced Basel III reforms to increase capital buffers and reduce systemic risk. In Singapore, the Total Debt Servicing Ratio (TDSR) was introduced in 2013 to ensure that borrowers do not take on excessive housing debt. Loan-to-value limits were tightened. Property curbs became stricter. These changes aimed to rebuild trust in the financial system—but also made credit harder to access for borderline borrowers. Some warned of overcorrection, especially in lower-income communities.

The word “subprime” fell out of favor—but its logic reappeared in new forms.

• Subprime auto loans in the US reached $1.5 trillion in 2024, with rising delinquency rates.
• Buy-now-pay-later (BNPL) platforms offer unsecured credit with minimal vetting—some securitize these receivables.
• Installment loans and payday products remain prevalent among low-income borrowers.

In Southeast Asia, digital lenders and e-wallet platforms are experimenting with embedded lending models, raising fresh questions around consumer protection, default incentives, and data transparency. Just like in 2006, many of these new credit tools are bundled, resold, or wrapped in complex investor products. And just like before, the borrower may be the last to understand the true terms.

It’s easy to assume that subprime defaults hurt only the borrower. But in an interconnected system, defaults can:

• Weaken investor portfolios (especially pension funds, endowments)
• Trigger bank write-downs, affecting liquidity and credit availability
• Lead to forced asset sales, pushing down market values
• Prompt government bailouts, which ultimately affect taxpayers

In 2008, ordinary citizens bore the cost through job losses, housing value collapse, and depleted retirement funds. The crisis also widened inequality, as wealthier households recovered faster. That’s why subprime regulation isn’t just a banking issue—it’s a citizen issue.

Subprime loans aren’t always marketed as such. But there are markers:

• High interest rates despite small loan amounts
• Balloon payments or sudden rate hikes after introductory periods
• Low or no documentation requirements
• Fees stacked into repayments rather than disclosed upfront
• Resale or securitization language in the loan agreement

If you see these signs—especially in digital lending or auto financing—ask questions. Who’s servicing the loan? Can it be sold? What happens if you miss a payment? Remember, credit is priced not just on your ability to repay, but on the lender’s ability to transfer the risk elsewhere.

Singapore’s property market, while heated, has largely avoided a subprime-style meltdown. That’s due in part to:

• The Mortgage Servicing Ratio (MSR) and TDSR, which cap debt based on income
• Government-run credit bureaus and mandatory CPF contributions
• A strong culture of homeownership tied to retirement adequacy

In the UAE and Saudi Arabia, financial inclusion is expanding rapidly. The challenge is managing first-time borrower access without replicating the pitfalls of 2000s-era subprime lending. Both countries have introduced credit bureaus, consumer finance regulations, and Shariah-compliant frameworks to safeguard credit expansion.

Still, as digital banks and BNPL platforms enter these markets, the architecture needs continual oversight.

Even if you're not a subprime borrower, the lessons still apply:

• Do you understand the full cost of your loan?
• Can you repay even if interest rates rise or your income falls?
• Is your loan being securitized or resold?
• What recourse do you have if a lender becomes insolvent?

Financial literacy can’t prevent systemic collapse—but it can protect individuals from being the first to fall.

The subprime crisis wasn’t just about bad loans. It was about how risk, once deemed individual, became structurally embedded in global markets. Today’s credit innovations—BNPL, embedded finance, AI-driven scoring—don’t eliminate this risk. They just repackage it. As credit systems evolve, regulators and citizens alike must remain alert to where accountability lies. Borrowing is personal. But lending, increasingly, is industrial. And when the machinery fails, the damage is collective.